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1.1. Anxiety and avoidance in psychogenic nonepileptic seizures
Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNESs) bear a superﬁcial resem-blance 
with epileptic seizures are caused by abnormal electrical activity in the bra
threatening situations, sensations, emotions, thoughts, or memories [1,2]. In
theories offer dif-ferent accounts of PNESs [3], all recognize the patient's resp
reﬂect an inability, failure, or unwillingness to actively engage with anxiety. Th
a greater preference for avoidant coping strategies and are more likely to so
relatively little research has speciﬁcally addressed avoidance in PNESs despite i
Within the broader psychological literature, avoidance of anxiety or avo
frequently associated with psychopathology [11–13]. Experiential avoidance is
own thoughts, sensations, and emo-tions, particularly anxiety-provoking ones [
arguably most likely to precipitate clinical syndromes such as PNESs [15].
Anxiety itself is a complex physiological and behavioral experience wit
‘explicit cognition’ refers to thoughts or experiences in one's subjective awar
attitudes, beliefs, preferences, learning processes, emotional experiences, or ore captured using indirect mea  
two would ar-guably be more p  
onality disorder [21]. Given the  
e to expect similar discrepanciespileptic seizures. However, whereas the experiences and behaviors associated 
most PNESs are considered to be a psy-chological dissociative reaction to 
, while psychodynamic, cognitive, behavioral, and systemic psychological 
e to anxiety as a signiﬁcant contributing factor and suggest that PNESs may 
ecognition is supported by evidence that patients with PNESs generally report 
cize their distress compared with those with epilepsy [4–10]. Nevertheless, 
ey role in many psychological theories about the etiology of PNESs.
nce of other introspective experiences, termed ‘experiential avoidance’, is 
t merely the avoidance of certain situations but rather the avoidance of one's 
 Such avoidance can be voluntary or involuntary, with the involuntary aspect 
th ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ cognitive components [16,17].As detailed below,
s, as typically captured via self-report measures; ‘implicit cognition’ refers to
 knowledge or cognitive processes (e.g., attitudes about oneself or others) that
sures [18,19]. Implicit and explicit measures are typically unrelated or only
ronounced among patients with limited self-awareness and have, for instance,
types of personality pathology associated with PNESs, including abnormalities
 between implicit and explicit measures in patients with nonepileptic seizures.
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 Studies comparing anxiety in individuals with PNESs and epilepsy have
failed to identify clear and consistent differences, although the prevalence rate
of anxiety disorders have been found to be approxi-mately twice as high in both
groups as in the general population [25,26]. Some studies showed similar mean
levels of self-reported anxiety in patients with epilepsy or PNESs [27,28]
whereas others found signiﬁcant [29] or trend-level differences [30]. Such
inconsis-tencies may be explained, in part, by the use of explicit measures
which not only are susceptible to social desirability biases but also as-sume a
level of insight and awareness and an ability to accurately report on interna
states — skills that may be diminished in individuals with neurologica
disorders or individuals who tend to avoid interoceptive experiences. Self-repor
measures such as the MMPI, which attempt to circumvent these problems, have
been more likely to ﬁnd group differences [29,31], although ﬁndings have no
been consistently repli-cated and have been questioned in terms of sensitivity
and speciﬁcity for the differential diagnosis of epilepsy and PNESs [32] (also
discussed in [33]). What is more, while the MMPI has been used extensively, i
does not separate clearly between psychopathology and normal ﬁndings, doe
not speciﬁcally describe different types of avoidance be-haviors, and canno
measure implicit cognition.
1.2. Implicit cognition and measurement
‘Implicit cognition’ is a term widely used by psychologists to refer to
hypothetical psychological attributes (e.g., beliefs about self or others, as noted
earlier) that are outside of conscious awareness and, therefore, introspectively
inaccessible [34]. Importantly, these cognitions can have a strong impact on
physiological responses [35] and behavior [36]. Measures of implici
cognition aim to provide an index of an attitude or cognition withou
requiring a participant's awareness or conscious access to the attribute unde
investigation [37,38].  This  is  achieved through tasks where participant
respond in an “automatic manner” (p. 347 [39]), with little or no opportunity fo
attentional con-trollability or self-monitoring [19,40,41].
Implicit measures often employ a response latency (reaction time) paradigm
underpinned by an assumption that implicit cognitive biases can be detected by
examining efﬁciency of cognitive processing [19,40]. This can be done through
the aggregation of many overt responses (e.g., key presses on computerized
tasks), frequently under time pres-sure, and across various types of stimuli (e.g.
words or pictures related to a targeted attribute) [42,43]. Studies using implici
measures have offered evidence for their convergent and discriminant validity in
dif-ferent scenarios and groups [44,45], with  research to date  ﬁnding tha
implicit indices appear to be better than self-report or clinical judge-ment a
predicting important clinical behaviors such as suicide at-tempts [46], substance
misuse [47], and sexual offending [48].
Very few previous studies have used measures of implicit cognition in patient
with PNESs. One prior study compared covert attitudes toward sickness in patient
with PNESs, patients with epilepsy, and controls using an Implicit Association
Test that examined responses to pairings of sickness-related words and pleasan
words [49]; however, there were no signiﬁcant group differences in implici
attitudes toward sick-ness despite differences in reports of clinical symptoms (e.g.
greater so-matic complaints in those with PNESs versus those with epilepsy). Othe
studies found that individuals with PNESs do have implicit biases com-pared
with healthy controls in that they show greater emotional arousal to neutral stimul
[50] and direct greater preconscious attention toward threat cues (angry faces
[51]). Therefore, it is possible that individuals with PNESs have a greate
underlying — or implicit — sense of anxiety.
One contemporary measure of implicit cognition is the Implicit Rela-tiona
Assessment Procedure (IRAP; [43]). The IRAP involves presenting (frequen
word) stimuli with speciﬁc ‘relational terms’ (e.g., true, false, same, and
opposite) so that the relationships between the presentedstimuli (termed verbal relations) can be assessed. For example, partici-pants 
may be shown a statement such as ‘I am  — anxious’ or ‘Others are — 
anxious’ and asked to conﬁrm or deny this relationship (in this example by 
choosing the term ‘true’ or ‘false’). Importantly, participants are asked to 
respond quickly and accurately to these statements in ways that, depending on 
the trial type, are consistent or inconsistent with their beliefs. In the present 
study, for example, participants were asked to deny being anxious during 
consistent trials (e.g., selecting ‘false’ to the stimuli ‘I am — anxious’) and to 
endorse the opposite during inconsistent trials (e.g., selecting ‘true’ to the 
stimuli ‘I am — anxious’). The methodology is predicated on the assumption 
that the strength of speciﬁc implicit verbal relations is reﬂected in the 
participant's response times; more simply, the basic IRAP principle is that 
average response latencies are relatively shorter across trials consistent with 
the participant's “true” (implicit) beliefs (e.g., those statements that cohere with 
the participant's implicit verbal relations) compared with trials in-consistent 
with their beliefs.
A wealth of studies have demonstrated the IRAP effect, providing 
support for its utility and reliability as an implicit measure (see [52] for an 
overview). Furthermore, research has indicated that the IRAP compares 
favorably with other implicit measures of individual differ-ences [53], is 
perhaps less susceptible to ‘faking’ or overt manipulation [54], and can target 
clinically relevant phenomena [48,55].
1.3. Aims and hypotheses
The research outlined above suggests that anxiety and experiential 
avoidance may play a key part in PNESs. Speciﬁcally, this study aimed to (1) 
compare individuals with PNESs, individuals with epilepsy, and nonclinical 
controls on implicit and explicit measures of anxiety;(2) examine 
discrepancies between implicit and explicit anxiety within these groups; (3) 
examine correlations between anxiety and avoidance in PNESs; and (4) 
establish whether these measures of anxiety or avoidance have predictive 
utility in differentiating diagnostic groups. It was hypothesized that patients 
with PNESs would report higher levels of (explicit) anxiety and experiential 
avoidance compared with those with epilepsy or controls. However, previous 
studies have also highlighted that patients with PNESs are more likely than 
those with epilepsy to deny the relevance of psychological factors for their 
seizures [56], and, therefore, we predicted that those with PNESs would show 
greater implicit anxiety and show greater discrepancies between im-plicit and 
explicit anxiety (i.e., greater implicit relative to explicit anxiety) compared 
with those with epilepsy or controls.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty adults with PNESs and 25 adults with epilepsy (13 with focal 
epilepsy, 5 with idiopathic generalized epilepsy, and 7 with unclassiﬁ-able 
epilepsy) were recruited from outpatient seizure clinics at the Shefﬁeld 
Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust between February and September 
2012. All diagnoses were made by neurologists special-izing in the treatment 
of seizures, and only those whose diagnoses were supported by a previous 
video-EEG recording of a typical seizure were included. Patients with mixed 
seizure disorders (epilepsy and PNESs) were excluded. Thirty-one adults with 
no reported history of seizures were recruited through an advertisement and 
served as a nonclinical control group. All participants were at least 18 years 
old. Individuals unable to complete self-report questionnaires unaided, not 
ﬂuent in English, and physically unable to a use a computer were excluded.
2.2. Ethical approval
The research was approved by both the Leeds Research and Ethics Committee 
(REC) and the Research Ofﬁce of the Shefﬁeld Teaching
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Table 1
The stimulus arrangements for the IRAPANX.
Sample 1: I am Sample 2: Others are
Response option 1: true Response option 2: false
Target stimuli consistent with sample 1 Target stimuli consistent with sample 2
Calm Tense
Relaxed Nervous
Rested Anxious
Comfortable Scared
Secure Afraid
Laid-back WorriedHospitals NHS Foundation Trust. All participants provided written in-formed
consent in accordance with REC guidance and Helsinki Good Clinica
Practice.
2.3. Procedure
This was a prospective study; participants were informed that the study
was looking at differences in unconscious thinking prior to consenting and
initially completed a brief demographic questionnaire before proceeding to
the self-report measures outlined below. The order of the questionnaires was
randomized using an online research randomizer (available from http:/
www.randomizer.org). Following the completion of these measures
participants completed an IRAP pro-cedure designed for the present study
(detailed further below). Asses-sors were not blinded to diagnosis; however
participants completed the questionnaires independently and separate from
assessors.
2.3.1. Demographic and medical history
Basic demographic information (age, gender, and level of education), seizure
diagnosis, and seizure frequency were self-reported. Partici-pants were also
asked to specify in an open-ended fashion whether they had any current or
previous mental health problems.
2.3.2. Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
The STAI is an explicit self-report measure of state and trait anxiety [57]. I
is composed of 40 questions with response options ranging from 1 (not at all
almost never) to 4 (very much so/almost always) on a Likert-type scale. This
produces two subscale raw scores ranging from 20 to 80, with higher scores
reﬂecting higher levels of either state or trait anxiety. The STAI was chosen
because of its ability to examine both state and trait constructs with test–retes
reliability of .40 and .86, respectively. It also has concurrent validity with other
measures of anxiety having correlations around .80 [58]. The Cronbach  alpha
scores for the state and trait measures in this study were .93 and .95
respectively. The state measure of the STAI has also been used as a screening
tool for mental disorders in general, with an optimal cutoff score of 54/55 for an
accuracy of .87 [59].
2.3.3. Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-15)
The PHQ-15 was used as a screening tool for somatization and so-matic
symptoms [60]. The measure comprises 15 somatic symptoms; each scored
either 0 (“not bothered at all”), 1 (“bothered a little”), or 2 (“bothered a lot”)
Total scores range from 0 to 30 and are classiﬁed as reﬂecting minimum (0–4)
mild (5–9), moderate (10–14), or severe (15+) somatization. The measure was
not developed as a standalone diagnostic tool but used to supplement other
clinical information. The PHQ-15 has good internal consistency (Cronbach's
alpha of .80) and moderate associations between items [60]. The test–retes
reliability is moderate with a κ coefﬁcient of .60 [61].
2.3.4. Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ)
Experiential avoidance was measured with the MEAQ [62]. This  self-
report questionnaire asks participants to indicate the extent to which they agree
or disagree with 62 statements (e.g., “When nega-tive thoughts come up, I try to
ﬁll my head with something else”) on a  6-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Total scores range from 62 to 372, with a higher
score equating to higher endorsement of avoidance-related statements. Aspects
of experiential avoidance measured by the MEAQ include the following
behavioral avoidance, distress aversion, procrastination, distraction and
suppres-sion, repression and denial, and distress endurance. The alpha for the
total MEAQ score is excellent (.91–.92) with average interitem correla-tion in
the low to moderate range (.15) reﬂecting the multidimensional nature of the
questionnaire and indicating its assessment of a broader range of conten
compared with other measures of experiential avoid-ance. In this study, the
Cronbach alpha was .91 for the overall scale.2.3.5. Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP)
An IRAP which aimed to speciﬁcally target implicit anxiety was developed 
by the authors (IRAPANX). The stimulus set for the IRAPANX was designed to 
reﬂect the dimensions of the STAI (Table 1), with stimuli and response options 
presented and recorded by the IRAP soft-ware (available from 
irapresearch.org). One of two category labels (“I am” or “Others are”) was 
presented on each trial, with a single target stimulus taken from two sets of 
stimuli: one set of target stimuli contained anxious terms (e.g., anxious) and 
the other their semantically opposite terms (e.g., calm). Two response options 
(“true” or “false”) were also presented on each trial. During consistent trials, 
participants were required to conﬁrm that they were calm and to deny being 
anxious; during inconsistent trials, these response requirements were reversed.
The IRAP task was presented on a portable laptop computer. Partic-ipants 
read through instructions presented visually with the experi-menter (see 
appendix A). These instructions explained the IRAP procedure and how to 
complete the task and highlighted that accuracy and speed in responding were 
a prerequisite to progress to the test phase. Participants were speciﬁcally 
informed that it would sometimes be necessary to respond to the stimuli in a 
manner consis-tent with their beliefs and sometimes in ways that may be 
inconsistent with their beliefs. Participants were instructed to derive the correct 
response style for each block of trials but were not told which trials were 
considered to be consistent or inconsistent. To ensure under-standing of the 
task and minimize random responding, each participant was administered at 
least two practice blocks until they achieved an average response time of less 
than 3 s and an accuracy rating above 80% (in line with previous research 
[48]).
Each trial comprised a category label (“I am” or “Others are”) 
appearing at the top of the screen, with one of 12 target words in the center 
(e.g., “anxious”, “worried”, and “calm”) and the two response options “true” 
and “false” in the bottom corners. All of the stimuli (label, target, and 
response options) were presented simultaneously (Fig. 1) and remained on the 
screen until the participant selected one of the relational terms by pressing the 
‘D’ key for ‘true’ or the ‘K’ key for ‘false’. Choosing the relational term 
deemed “correct” for a particular trial removed all stimuli from the screen for 
400 ms before the next trial was presented. Choosing the relational term 
that was deemed “incorrect” for that particular trial produced a red “X” in 
the center of the screen. To remove the X and proceed to the 400-millisecond 
inter-trial interval, participants were required to select the correct response 
option.
An accurate response was dependent on whether a consistent or 
inconsistent trial was administered. During consistent blocks of the 
IRAPANX, participants were required to categorize themselves as calm (e.g., I 
am — Calm — True and I am — Anxious — False) and others as anx-ious (e.g., 
Others are — Anxious — True and Others are — Calm — False). During 
inconsistent blocks, the response contingencies were reversed. Fig. 1 
illustrates the two category labels with their respective consistent and 
inconsistent stimuli.
During the IRAP, participants were exposed to six test blocks, alter-nating 
between consistent and inconsistent blocks, each with 24 trials.
Fig. 1. Examples of the four trial types in the IRAPANX. Arrows with text boxes showing responses consistent/inconsistent did not appear onscreen and are shown for illustrative purposes only.The category label and target stimuli within each block were random-ized with 
the constraint that stimuli were not presented more than three times with each 
sample. Visual instructions after each test block indicated that the next block 
would involve reversing the previously correct and incorrect responses. Once 
the ﬁnal block was completed, participants were thanked and debriefed.
2.4. IRAP data preparation
Raw latency data from the IRAP (time in milliseconds from trial onset to 
participant response) were converted into a D measure (D-IRAP), consistent 
with current implicit measure research outlined by Barnes-Holmes and 
colleagues [63]. The D transformation serves to minimize the impact of 
individual variability relating to extraneous variables such as age, cognitive 
ability, and/or motor skills offering a cleaner response latency measurement 
[64]. D scores are relative to re-sponse latency differences with larger scores 
indicating greater differ-ences in response latencies between consistent and 
inconsistent trials. Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure raw scores were 
transformed into ﬁve D-IRAP scores: one for each of the four trial types and an 
overall D-IRAP effect score (mean of the four trial-type scores). Positive 
scores reﬂect responding in line with preexperimentally determined consis-tent 
items (in the current study: self as calm and others as anxious) and negative 
scores reﬂect the reverse (i.e., self as anxious and others as calm). Table 2 
details the conversion procedure of the raw latency data. To facilitate 
interpretation of the results and comparability withTable 2
The method for converting raw latency scores to the D-Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (D-IR
Step
1 Only use test block data.
2 Eliminate latencies above 10,000 ms from the data set.
3 Remove all data for a participant if 10% of the test block response latencies are less than 300 ms.
4 Calculate 12 standard deviations for the four trial types: 4 from the response latencies from test blo
mean latencies for the four trial types in each test block.
6 Calculate difference scores for each of the four trial types, for each pair of test blocks, by subtract
corresponding inconsistent test block.
7 Divide each difference score by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding 12 D-IR
overall trial-type D-IRAP scores by averaging the three scores.
8 For each trial type across the three pairs of test blocks. Calculate an overall relative D-IRAP score
9 Scores from step 8.explicit measures, the computed self-trial D-IRAP scores were reverse-scored 
prior to statistical analysis. Consequently, in analyses reported below, positive 
scores are indicative of anxiety (response tendency toward self as anxious), 
and negative scores reﬂect the reverse (self as calm). Implicit anxiety scores 
are, thus, tuned in the same direction as explicit anxiety scores: i.e., higher 
positive scores indicative of greater anxiety.
2.5. Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was completed with IBM SPSS for Windows version 
20.0. The explicit measurement data (i.e., self-report measures of state anxiety, 
trait anxiety, somatic symptoms, and experiential avoidance) were analyzed 
using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Speciﬁc predictions 
were tested using analysis of variance (ANOVA). Welch's adjusted F is 
reported where the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. 
Where signiﬁcant differences were found, Tukey's HSD tests were used to 
determine where the differ-ences were and correct for multiple comparisons.
For the purpose of computing implicit–explicit discrepancy scores, all 
indices of self-referent anxiety (explicit trait, explicit state, and implicit self-
trials) were ﬁrst transformed into z-scores (enabling direct compa-rability) 
using the appropriate whole sample mean and SD. For example, individual trait 
anxiety z-scores were computed as: z-trait = (observed STAI trait score − Grand 
Mean STAI trait/Grand SD). Computed z-scores were then used to compute 
discrepancy scores by subtracting theAP) scores.
cks 1 and 2, 4 from test blocks 3 and 4, and a further 4 from test blocks 5 and 6. 5 Calculate 24 
ing the mean latency of the consistent test block from the mean latency of the
AP scores, 1 score for each trial type for each pair of test blocks. Calculate the four
 by averaging all 12 trial-type D-IRAP.
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Fig. 2. Mean self and other D-IRAPANX scores.
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implicit z-score (z-transformed D-IRAPANX self-trials) from the rele-vant 
explicit z-score (z-trait for trait discrepancy; z-state for state discrepancy). 
In this way, higher positive discrepancy scores were indic-ative of greater explicit 
relative to implicit anxiety. Transformed z-scores were only used in computation 
of the anxiety discrepancy scores; un-transformed scores were used in 
analyses of the variables from which these discrepancy scores were derived 
(preserving original scaling).
3. Results
3.1. Demographics
Groups were closely matched on the variables of gender, age, and 
education (ps N .05), as well as on self-reported seizure frequency (p N .05) 
but differed signiﬁcantly in relation to self-reported mental health problems (p 
= .021, Fisher's exact test; see Table 3). Participants who self-reported having a 
mental health problem all stated that they experienced depression, an anxiety 
disorder, or both. The groups with PNESs and epilepsy did not differ 
signiﬁcantly in terms of the proportion of patients above the STAI 
psychopathology cutoff.
3.2. IRAP results
Eight participants (3 with PNESs, 3 with epilepsy, and 2 controls) were 
unable to complete the IRAP tasks within the set criterion (median b3 s, N80% 
accuracy). Data from all other participants were retained fol-lowing the 
transformation of raw latencies into the D-IRAP scores. The self and other 
mean D-IRAPANX scores for the three groups (N = 78) are presented in Fig. 
2. The data show that all groups demonstrated a general bias toward self and 
others as calm (illustrated by negative scores).
A 3 × 4 mixed repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
the D-IRAPANX scores, with diagnosis as the between-participants variable and 
trial type as the within-participant variable. There was a substantial effect for 
trial type, F (3, 75) = 30.85, p b .001, ηp = .01, with faster responding on the 
self-trials versus the other-trials. The analysis revealed no signiﬁcant 
interaction between diagnosis and trial type, F, (6, 225) = .47, p = .87, ηp = .02, 
with all groups demon-strating similar responses F (2, 75) = .59, p = .56, ηp 
= .02. Four one-way between-participants ANOVAs were also used to conduct 
planned comparisons for each trial type. No signiﬁcant effects were foundTable 3
Demographic and clinical data of the three groups.
Controls
(n = 31)
21 (67.7)
10 (32.3)
42.97 (13.93)
Gender (%)
Females
Males
Mean age (SD)
Highest level of education (%)
6 (19.4)
10 (32.3)
7 (22.6)
7 (22.6)
Secondary school 
College/sixth-form 
Diploma
UG degree
PG qualiﬁcation 1 (3.2)
Number reporting mental health problems (%)
23 (74.2)
6 (19.4)
None 
Past 
Present 2 (6.5)
1 (3.2)Number above STAI psychopathology cutoff (%) 
Number of seizures reported per month
–Mean (SD) 
Median (IQR) –
Note: SD = standard deviation; IQR = interquartile range; UG = Undergraduate; PG = Post-graduate; gr
psychopathology cutoff were tested using Fisher's exact test to account for small cell sizes; gender was te
self-report estimates and tested using the Kruskal–Wallis test.2
2
(p values ≥ .47). Contrary to our expectations, this suggests no differ-ences in 
implicit anxiety between the diagnostic categories.
3.3. Explicit measures
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was con-ducted
with group as an independent variable and the four explicit measures (trait
anxiety, state anxiety, somatization, and experiential avoidance) as dependent
variables. There was a signiﬁcant multivari-ate effect of group, Wilks' Lambda
= .49, F (8, 160) = 8.73, p b .001, ηp = .30. To determine which variable(s)
differed between groups, a series of four one-way between-groups ANOVAs
was carried out. To conservatively protect against multiple testing errors, the
alpha criterion for these follow-up ANOVAs was adjusted using sequential
Holm–Bonferroni correction (from smallest to largest observed p value, the
threshold for signiﬁcance of omnibus F statistics, thus, ranged from p b .0125 to p
b .05).
There was a signiﬁcant effect of group on trait anxiety, Welch's F (2, 54.5)
= 6.17, p = .004, ηp = .15. Tukey's HSD test indicated that the group with
PNESs (M = 79.00, SD = 50.10) scored signiﬁcantly higher compared with the
control group (M = 61.00, SD = 42.84). The  group with epilepsy
(M = 64.00, SD = 38.23) did not differ signiﬁcantly from either the control or the
group with PNESs. Group differences did not reach signiﬁcance for state
anxiety, as measured by Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, F (2, 83) =
3.08, p = .051, ηp = .07.Epilepsy
(n = 25)
PNESs
(n = 30)
p
16 (64.0) 22 (73.3)
9 (36.0) 8 (26.7) .75
39.40 (16.49) 40.87 (12.88) .65
4 (16.0) 8 (26.7)
9 (36.0) 12 (40.0)
5 (20.0) 5 (16.7)
2 (8.0) 4 (13.3)
5 (20.0) 1  (3.3) .43
17 (68.0) 14 (46.7)
5 (20.0) 4 (13.3)
3 (12.0) 12 (40.0) .02
2 (8.0) 7 (23.3) .16
4.38 (7.48) 7.36 (7.45)
1.0 (0.0–7.3) 6.0 (2.0–12.0) .09
oup differences for highest level of education, number reporting mental health problems, and STAI 
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Fig. 4. Discrepancies between implicit and explicit anxiety.2
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There was a signiﬁcant difference between the three groups on reported
somatic symptoms, as measured by the PHQ15; Welch's F (2, 52.49) =
29.21, p b .001, ηp = .49. Tukey's HSD  test  revealed  that the group with
PNESs (M = 14.80, SD = 6.19) scored signiﬁcantly higher compared with the
control group (M = 5.00, SD = 3.33) and the group with epilepsy (M = 6.60, SD
= 3.46). The group with epilepsy and the control group did not signiﬁcantly
differ from each other.
Finally, there was a signiﬁcant difference between the three groups on
experiential avoidance (MEAQ total score); Welch's F (2, 54.07) = 8.89, p
b .001, ηp = .21. Tukey's HSD test indicated that the group with PNESs (M =
235.50, SD = 48.86) scored signiﬁcantly higher com-pared with the control
group (M = 190.03, SD = 34.73) and the group  with epilepsy (M = 198.68, SD
= 33.37). The group with epilepsy and the control group did not differ
signiﬁcantly from each other.
Overall, consistent with expectations, the group with PNESs scored
signiﬁcantly higher compared with the healthy control group and the group
with epilepsy on somatization and experiential avoidance; the group with
PNESs also scored signiﬁcantly higher on trait anxiety compared with the
control group (but not the group with epilepsy). Fig. 3 summarizes group
scoring on the explicit measures and highlights signiﬁcant differences.
3.4. Implicit–explicit discrepancies
To test the hypothesis that there would be larger discrepancies between the
implicit and explicit measures of anxiety in patients with PNESs, a one-way
between-groups ANOVA was conducted. There was a statistically signiﬁcant
difference for the three groups in terms of discrepant anxiety, F (2, 75) = 6.26,
p = .003, ηp = .14. Tukey's HSD test indicated that the group with PNESs had
signiﬁcantly larger discrepancies compared with the control group and the
group with epilepsy, who did not differ signiﬁcantly from each other. These
dis-crepancies are illustrated in Fig. 4.
3.5. Relationships between avoidance and anxiety
Within-group relationships between experiential avoidance and anxiety/
somatization were examined using Pearson's correlations (see Table 4). For
each set of correlations within each group (i.e., control, epilepsy, and PNESs),
signiﬁcance levels were adjusted for multiple testing using a sequential Holm–
Bonferroni procedure. Table 4 high-lights both relationships that were only
signiﬁcant before adjusting the .05 alpha criterion for multiple testing (*) and
relationships that0
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Fig. 3. Mean scores on each of the explicit self-report measures, with standard bars indi-cating 
one standard error; *p b .05.remained signiﬁcant after adjustment (**). Given the limited power within 
each group, it can be seen that only relationships with large effect-sizes (rs 
≈ .50) met adjusted criteria for signiﬁcance.
After adjustment, avoidance was positively associated with (1) higher 
explicit trait anxiety levels and (2) greater discrepancy scores be-tween (high) 
explicit trait anxiety and relatively (low) implicit anxiety in the group with 
PNESs. No signiﬁcant relationships were found be-tween avoidance and 
implicit anxiety scores in the group with PNESs (ps N .16), and none of the 
relationships were signiﬁcant for the group with epilepsy or the control group.
3.6. Psychological factors and seizure frequency
The relationship between state and trait anxiety, experiential avoid-ance, 
and somatization and seizure frequency was investigated using Spearman's 
rank order correlations (Table 5). For each family of tests (correlations within 
each group and comparative Fisher Z tests), signif-icance levels were 
adjusted for multiple testing using a sequential Holm–Bonferroni procedure 
as before.
In the group with epilepsy, there were no signiﬁcant correlations between 
seizure frequency and any of the psychological measures. In the group with 
PNESs, there were strong positive correlations between seizure frequency and 
trait anxiety, implicit anxiety, and avoidance.
3.7. Predicting diagnosis
As somatization (PHQ-15) and experiential avoidance (MEAQ) were 
signiﬁcantly higher in the group with PNESs compared with the group with 
epilepsy, these were analyzed by using univariate binary logistic regression to 
assess how well they predicted diagnoses. The full model containing both 
predictors was statistically signiﬁcant, χ2 (3, N = 55) = 32.05 p b .001, 
indicating that the model couldTable 4
Correlations with experiential avoidance.
Controls Epilepsy PNESs
State anxiety
Explicit −.05 .02 .41⁎
Explicit–implicit −.09 .10 .27
Trait anxiety
Explicit .09 .20 .63⁎⁎
Explicit–implicit .00 .24 .49⁎⁎
Somatization .10 −.13 .18
Implicit anxiety
Self D-IRAPANX .10 −.10 .16
⁎ Indicates r values that are signiﬁcant at the unadjusted p b 0.05 level.
⁎⁎ Indicates r values that remain signiﬁcant following Holm–Bonferroni correction for
multiple testing (all ps b .01).
Table 5
Correlations with seizure frequency.
Group with
epilepsy
Group with
PNESs
Test of difference:
Fisher Z
State anxiety
Explicit −.06 .36 −1.52
−.07 −.16 0.32Explicit–implicit 
Trait anxiety
−.03 .67⁎⁎ −2.93⁎⁎Explicit Explicit–
implicit −.04 .16 −0.42
.34 .38 −0.16
−.02 .55⁎⁎ −2.22⁎
Somatization 
Experiential avoidance 
Implicit anxiety
Self D-IRAPANX .09 .56⁎⁎ −1.89
⁎ Indicates r and two-tailed Fisher Z values that are signiﬁcant at the unadjusted p b 0.05 level.
⁎⁎ Indicates r and two-tailed Fisher Z values that remain signiﬁcant following Holm–
Bonferroni correction for multiple testing (all ps b .01).4. Discussion
The current study aimed to examine implicit and explicit anxiety in people 
with PNESs, explore the relationship with experiential avoidance and PNES 
frequency, and determine whether they could be useful in dis-criminating 
between people with PNESs and epilepsy.
In line with previous ﬁndings, individuals diagnosed with PNESs or 
epilepsy self-reported signiﬁcantly higher levels of anxiety compared with 
nonclinical controls [28]. However, no signiﬁcant differences were found 
between the two clinical groups themselves. The group with PNESs endorsed 
signiﬁcantly more somatic complaints compared with both the group with 
epilepsy and the healthy control group, as well as reported signiﬁcantly higher 
levels of experiential avoidance con-sistent with previous ﬁndings [2,65]. 
Frequency of PNESs was strongly correlated with explicit anxiety scores and 
experiential avoidance; how-ever, consistent with some previous reports [66] 
but in contrast with others [67], psychological factors as measured in the 
present study were unrelated to the frequency of epileptic seizures within the 
group with epilepsy.
Uniquely, this study also examined implicit anxiety in people with PNESs. 
In contrast to our expectations, we found no clear differences be-tween 
patients with PNESs and those with epilepsy or healthy controls in terms of 
implicit anxiety. Importantly, however, we did detect signif-icantly larger 
discrepancies in implicit and explicit anxiety scores in the group with PNESs 
compared with the two comparison groups. What is more, there was a strong 
positive correlation between implicit anxiety scores and PNES (but not 
epileptic seizure) frequency. These novel ﬁndings are discussed in more detail 
below.
predict individuals with either PNESs or epilepsy. The model was able to 
explain between 44.2% (Cox and Snell R square) and 59.1%(Nagelkerke R 
square) of the variance in diagnosis and correctly classi-ﬁed 83.6% of the 
cases (84.0% sensitivity and 83.3% speciﬁcity). As shown in Table 6, both 
somatic symptoms and avoidance made a unique statistically signiﬁcant 
contribution to the model. The addition of implicit anxiety scores did not 
improve the model signiﬁcantly.Table 6
Logistic regression predicting diagnosis.
B SE Wald Odds ratio 95% CI for
odds ratio
Lower upper
.32 .09 11.89⁎⁎ 1.34 1.15 1.65Somatization 
Experiential avoidance .02 .01 8.77⁎⁎ 1.02 1.00 1.04
Note: CI = conﬁdence interval.
⁎⁎ p b .01.4.1. Anxiety
The current ﬁndings suggest that individuals with PNESs may not hold 
automatic or unconscious perceptions of themselves as anxious, despite 
reporting more anxiety than control participants on explicit measures. One 
interpretation of these results is based on the dual-attitude model formulated by 
Wilson and colleagues that suggests that implicit measures reﬂect older, 
habitual cognition [68]. A proﬁle of low-implicit high-explicit anxiety could, 
therefore, be reﬂective of individuals who have become anxious later in life; in 
populations with PNESs, this may relate to explicit anxiety developing 
following the onset of the seizures themselves. However, a more plausible 
explana-tion for this pattern might be that the dissociation associated with 
PNESs themselves (combined with wider avoidance tendencies in a patient's 
life in between seizures) effectively stop patients from holding implicit 
anxious cognitive biases which they might have developed in the absence of 
PNESs. Consequently, those with PNESs may explicitly report anxiety while 
failing to “internalize” anxiety as part of their self-concept. Such a “protective” 
function of PNESs could also help explain the observation that patients with 
PNESs report more negative life events compared with those with epilepsy but 
fail to make a link be-tween these life events and their seizures [4] or that a 
large subgroup of patients with PNESs are limited in their emotional and 
psychological awareness [69].
Despite the fact that the group with PNESs was characterized by a 
discrepancy between low-implicit anxiety and high-explicit anxiety, we found 
a strong correlation between greater implicit anxiety and higher PNES 
frequency. It is possible that this ﬁnding reﬂects the psycho-pathological 
heterogeneity of PNESs: previous studies have identiﬁed at least two major 
groups characterized by low and high levels of emo-tional dysregulation [70]. 
Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures may be linked to implicit anxiety in some and 
explicit anxiety in other patients.
A previous study in a nonpatient population demonstrated that im-plicit 
anxiety predicted cardiovascular responses (i.e., heart rate and blood pressure) 
to threat above and beyond explicit measures [71]. Im-portantly, the authors of 
this study highlighted that implicit anxiety only predicted cardiovascular 
responses to acutely stressful events rather than cardiovascular responding 
more generally. Nevertheless, given that it predicted responses measured at 
later points in time, they suggest that implicit anxiety has a “trait”-like 
inﬂuence on behavior. Pre-vious studies have demonstrated that PNESs are 
associated with similar heart rate variability (HRV) changes to those seen in 
acute stress [72]. Future studies could explore to what extent implicit anxiety 
and seizure frequency relate to such physiological responses in this patient 
group.
This study is the ﬁrst to show a relationship between self-reported trait 
anxiety and PNES frequency. While the strong positive correlation does not 
allow us to draw deﬁnite conclusions about the direction of the relationship, 
the fact that trait rather than state anxiety was correlated with PNES frequency 
supports previous suggestions that anxiety plays an important etiological role in 
PNESs [65,73]. A variety of psychological theories can be applied to account 
for the proposed relationship be-tween PNESs and anxiety; psychodynamic 
theories, for example, con-ceptualize anxiety as the by-product of an 
intrapsychic conﬂict and propose that PNESs can be a symptom of that conﬂict 
[74]. Behavioral models of human functioning (e.g., [75]) can also be adapted 
to explain the observed relationship between anxiety and PNESs in terms of 
condi-tioned responses and reinforcement history; such theories postulate that 
anxiety is a conditioned response to a threat or trigger (e.g., a ﬂash-back or a 
familial conﬂict) and that PNESs consequently function as a negatively 
reinforcing response to threat and anxiety, perpetuating their occurrence in 
threat-inducing situations [76].
4.2. Experiential avoidance
As expected, as well as in line with previous research, individuals with 
PNESs reported higher levels of avoidance compared with those
with epilepsy [7,9,65,77]. The results of this study extend prior research by 
highlighting the idea that it is especially emotional experience that people with 
PNESs work to avoid, including greater avoidance of painful and uncomfortable 
feelings, emotional disconnection, and believing that negative emotions are 
damaging.
In the current sample, experiential avoidance did not correlate with 
somatic symptoms. However, avoidance was strongly correlated with self-
reported seizure frequency in the group with PNESs. The present study, 
therefore, is consistent with the idea that experiential avoidance (perhaps as an 
“overlearned” or practiced response style) may be a risk factor for the 
development of PNESs. Similarly, Myers and colleagues [69] found that 
reports of alexithymia, which refers to a lack of emo-tional awareness and 
expression, did not differ between PNESs and epilepsy but that within the 
group with PNESs, alexithymia was associ-ated with anxious arousal and 
avoidance.
Finally, we observed a strong positive correlation between discrep-ant 
implicit–explicit anxiety scores and experiential avoidance. Recent studies on 
implicit cognition have conceptualized such discrepancies from within a 
cognitive dissonance theory perspective [78], suggesting that aversive 
dissonance-related discomfort increases when implicit and explicit beliefs 
diverge [79]. The application of cognitive dissonance theory to PNESs may, 
therefore, suggest that nonepileptic seizures function to reduce cognitive 
dissonance, and targeting this dissonance (e.g., using strategies from 
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; [80])), is an avenue for future research and 
treatment approaches in populations with PNESs.
4.3. Implications
Recent developments in screening measures aimed at facilitating the 
differential diagnosis of epilepsy and PNESs are promising [81]. The re-sults 
presented here suggest that the inclusion of avoidance scales may enhance the 
predictive utility of such tools. The information provided by patients on such 
measures may also aid health professionals in devel-oping formulations and 
intervention plans and evaluating outcomes.
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and psychodynamic therapy are the 
leading published psychological interventions effective for PNESs [82–
86]. Our  ﬁndings support the idea that increasing tolerance of unpleasant 
emotions and reducing maladaptive avoidant behavior patterns might represent 
mechanisms of change in these approaches. Therapies which directly target 
experiential avoidance, such as accep-tance and commitment therapy (ACT), 
or DBT (which also addresses cognitive dissonance, as noted above [80]), may 
be useful in augment-ing treatment for patients with PNESs [87].
4.4. Limitations
There are a number of limitations within the current study that require 
acknowledgment. Patients were only recruited to the study if they had a ﬁrm 
diagnosis, but the amount of time for which they had been experiencing 
seizures, any formal psychiatric diagnosis, or whether they were prescribed 
any psychotropic medication or anti-epileptic drugs were not recorded. The 
fact that many patients had a chronic seizure disorder means that it is more 
difﬁcult to draw conclu-sions about the direction of the relationship between 
the psychological variables and PNESs. In addition, only the relationship 
between psycho-logical variables and seizure frequency was explored; one 
previous study showed that seizure severity was a predictor of psychological 
variables in epilepsy [66], and, therefore, future studies may want to consider 
the role of both severity and frequency. Moreover, this study was conducted 
with patients with seizures receiving current outpatient neurology care; it is, 
therefore, uncertain to what extent the results can be generalized to other 
patient groups.
In terms of methodology, the IRAP stimuli were developed speciﬁcal-ly to 
reﬂect dimensions of the explicit anxiety scale used in the study. The term 
‘others are’ was used to avoid double negatives (e.g., I amnot anxious — false), which can be problematic in IRAP research, but this 
rewording may have not been as effective in capturing people's beliefs about 
themselves in relation to others. Although there was no indication that our 
measure was ineffective in this population, it is nevertheless possible that there 
are differences in implicit cognition in people with PNESs that the IRAP did 
not successfully detect. The results of implicit assessments depend on the 
speciﬁc stimuli presented. It is important that the stimuli used are salient to the 
individual completing the measure and relate to the phenomena of interest. For 
example, nonword stimuli, or words based on other conceptualizations of 
anxiety, may have yielded different results.
Finally, this study did not use blinded assessors or implement any scales 
of effort or social desirability, and while it seems unlikely that differences in 
explicit anxiety were due to exaggerated responses, it is possible that the 
results were due to a response bias [88].
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, this study found signiﬁcant differences between peo-ple 
with PNESs, those with epilepsy, or those without a history of sei-zures in 
terms of experiential avoidance and explicit (self-reported) anxiety, as well as 
signiﬁcant relationships between PNES frequency with implicit anxiety, 
explicit anxiety, and experiential avoidance. While there were greater implicit 
versus explicit anxiety discrepancies in the group with PNESs, implicit anxiety 
levels did not differ between the three groups. These ﬁndings support various 
psychological models of PNESs and offer a rationale for psychological 
treatments targeting avoidant behavior patterns or cognitive dissonance.
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